10Ten-Year LensDuan Yongping's ideas, re-told EN中
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EP 07 · Nov 13, 2026 · 5:43

Cheap Compared to What?

5:43

A reader's spreadsheet carried a six percent discount rate. His only question was where that number came from.

Text

The question

This is Ten Year Lens — twenty years of Duan Yongping's public answers, translated, plus our reading of it. He is one of Asia's most successful investors.

A reader asked him to check a valuation. He had built a discounted cash flow model and wanted the arithmetic reviewed. He did not review the arithmetic. He asked where the discount rate came from — six percent, why six percent? — and said most of the assumptions behind it had no basis.

Quote

I have always felt that the discount rate each person uses should be their own long-term maximum opportunity cost. For people who do not really understand investing, the most appropriate opportunity cost is the risk-free rate.

The one sentence above is a direct quotation. Everything else on this page is our own summary and reading of it.

Our reading

Start with the word cheap. It sounds like a property of a stock, the way tall is a property of a building. It is not. Cheap is always a comparison, and a comparison needs a second thing. Most investors never name the second thing, which is why arguments about whether something is cheap can run for years with nobody actually wrong.

He names it. The second thing is what he would otherwise do with the money. That is the whole of his cost concept, and it is smaller than the word valuation suggests: not the price he paid, not the fees, not the tax — the next best use of the same money. He has put it in one line. Any investment that beats your opportunity cost is a decent investment.

Now the part that makes this unusual. If cost is the alternative, then the same stock can be a buy for one person and a pass for another, and both can be right. He says this out loud. Asked whether a particular company was worth owning, his answer was: it depends on what your money would otherwise earn. Someone with cash in a bank account has a different answer from someone who can compound at fifteen percent a year — and the difference is not intelligence.

This is where the discount rate comes in, and it is why he would not look at the spreadsheet. Why six percent? Where did that number come from? The reader had a model, a formula, a target price — and no answer to that question. Which means the model was not a valuation. It was an assertion with decimals.

His own answer is almost an anti-formula: each person's discount rate should be their own long-term maximum opportunity cost. Not the market's, not a textbook's, not the one that makes the spreadsheet come out nicely. For someone who does not invest at all, the right number is the risk-free rate, because that is genuinely what the money would otherwise do.

Sit with how strange that is. Two people look at the same business, use the same arithmetic, and reach different conclusions — not because one of them is smarter, but because their alternatives differ. Valuation stops being a property of the company and becomes a fact about the person doing it.

There is a hard consequence, and he does not soften it. If your hurdle is high, almost everything in the market is too expensive, and you will spend long stretches doing nothing. He looked at a software company trading at an enormous multiple and said he had tried to understand it and could not, that it was at least very expensive against his opportunity cost, and that he would not touch it. That is what a high hurdle sounds like from outside: not clever, just quiet.

And a second consequence that cuts the other way. He has also said that chasing the maximum return is a job for gods, and that beating your own opportunity cost is enough. So the hurdle is not a target to be maximised. It is a line below which the money should not go.

Here is the trap. Opportunity cost is easy to state and hard to feel, because the alternative is invisible. You can see the stock you bought. You cannot see the thing you did not buy, and no statement will ever arrive showing what it would have earned. So people compare their returns to zero instead of to their best realistic alternative, and feel fine about a year that lost to a savings account.

The boundary. This is not an argument for doing nothing when your alternative is bad. If your alternative really is a bank account, a decent business held for a long time will beat it — that is arithmetic, not courage. But it only beats it if you can actually hold it, which is the subject of another rule entirely.

A question back

So the question to take away comes before every valuation you will ever run. What would this money do if you did not put it here? Write the answer down, with a number, before you look at the stock. If you cannot write it down, you do not have a hurdle rate. You have a mood.

Disclaimer: an independent re-organisation and re-statement. Not official, and not affiliated with, licensed by or endorsed by any person or institution. Nothing here is investment advice — decide for yourself.